The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope. It covers all areas of foreign policy and questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the 'face and voice' of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service, and around 140 EU Delegations in third countries and international organizations.
Introduction
The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area -often referred to as EU foreign policy -has a broad scope. It covers all areas of foreign policy including all questions relating to security and defense (see, on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Duke 2016). Other EU external policies, such as trade, development cooperation, and humanitarian assistance, fall outside its scope. explain what the EU does in foreign policy. The ambiguity in foreign diplomatic recognition and a reliance on the resources of its member states makes the EU an unconventional international actor. Yet the EU has developed a strong international presence nonetheless. This also raises questions about the EU's international identity.
Does the EU present a different type of actor -a civilian or normative power -which derives its influence from non-traditional sources of power? Or is the EU, as sovereign states, driven by material interests?
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also a Vice-President The relations between EU and national foreign policy are critically important. The member states can act through the EU to achieve more impact internationally. At the same time, the CFSP puts pressure on the member states to adjust their national foreign policies. While EU foreign policy often complements national foreign policy, it can also replace and challenge national efforts. This raises questions of coherence. Finally, it is relevant to pay attention to the governance of EU foreign policy. The unique method of policy-making, through which member states and the EU institutions coordinate, define, and implement the CFSP, affects policy outcomes. As such, the machinery behind EU foreign policy is instrumental to understanding the role of the EU as an international actor and its relations with national foreign policy.
This article starts off by conceptualizing the EU as an actor in diplomatic and international affairs. It continues with the relations between EU and national foreign policy. It finally analyses the governance of EU foreign policy. The conclusion reflects on the status of CFSP research. This article focuses on key academic debates and does not seek to summarize the numerous studies on EU foreign policy towards particular regions and countries.
The EU as an International Actor
The starting point when studying EU foreign policy is to conceptualize the EU as an international actor. The domain of international relations is normally reserved for sovereign states. As a non-state actor, the EU is not automatically recognized by the other states, it cannot join all international organizations, and it has had difficulty participating in negotiations. A key question for scholars has thus been whether, in fact, the EU is an international actor. And if the EU can be considered an actor, what type of actor is it?
What are its ends and means? Before going to these questions, it is important to provide some background on EU foreign policy.
EU foreign policy has a long history. After the European Defence Community (EDC) failed ratification in the French Parliament in 1954 and following the rejection of the Fouchet Plans in the early 1960s, the member states established EPC in 1970. It was a modest attempt at foreign policy coordination. EPC was initially kept separate from economic integration in the context of the European Community. Foreign ministers and national diplomats would occasionally meet to exchange information on issues of international politics and work towards a harmonization of views and joint action whenever feasible and desirable. The frequency of these meetings and the scope of the agenda increased over time. The process also became institutionalized (Nuttall 1992; Smith 2004 ). Yet EPC remained an informal intergovernmental debating club until the creation of the CFSP with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.
Explaining the relative absence of the EU in the area of foreign policy was not difficult. Hoffmann (1966) , for example, distinguished between 'low' and 'high' politics when discussing the European project. Economic integration was perhaps achievable, but cooperation in foreign and security affairs was a different ball-game. Waltz (1979: 152) pointed at the primacy of the member states. The member states rather than "Western Europe as any kind of a power", he noted, had responded to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, albeit "behaving at once like hens and ostriches". Also Bull (1982: 151) was skeptical about the prospects of European integration in foreign policy: "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one; the Europe with which I am concerned is the actual one of state governments".
While the theorists of international relations and European integration could thus account for the slow pace with which EPC developed, they were much less capable of making sense of what EU foreign policy was actually about. This resulted in a new approach. Rather than defining actors along the lines of the characteristics of states, several scholars tried to come up with innovative criteria of 'actorness '. Sjöstedt (1977: 66) , for example, stated that "if [Europe] is capable of behaving as an actor it must be considered as such". To have actor capability would require Europe to stand out as a separate unit in the system from its member states (Sjöstedt 1977) . After defining such new criteria, scholars could assess to what extent Europe was an actor in international politics.
Based on these ideas, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) proposed a much-used operationalization of EU actorness. The EU requires recognition by being a member of international organizations or a party to international negotiations. It needs to have the authority to act internationally by having legal competences to represent the member states. Through distinctive and independent institutions, it acquires autonomy from its member states. It needs to have cohesion in terms of its goals, tactics, procedures and output. Fulfilling these criteria presents a challenge for the EU, particularly in the area of the CFSP. Yet the point was to have a yardstick to measure the degree of EU actorness across policy areas, regions, and time.
When EPC was rebranded into the CFSP in 1993, it was widely accepted that while the EU was perhaps not a fully-fledged actor, it had a considerable "presence" (Allen and Smith 1990) in international affairs. Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU continued to increase its mark on foreign policy. While its response to the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was hardly impressive, the post-Cold War era was more conducive of the EU playing a role in world politics. EU foreign policy was also strengthened through the establishment of new institutions such as the High Representative in 1999. The debate was therefore temporarily settled and moved to the question what type of actor the EU actually is.
The EU had traditionally been considered a 'civilian power' which was "long on economic power and relatively short on armed force" (Duchêne 1973: 19) . Through its trade and development policies, it was able to transform its economic weight into political objectives. The use of sanctions, which have become a favorite foreign policy tool of the EU, is another example. Attaching strings to development assistance is third 
EU and National Foreign Policy
If the EU can be conceptualized to a certain degree as an international actor, this immediately triggers the question how EU foreign policy relates to national foreign policy. After all, for the EU to be an actor requires a degree of autonomy from its member states. It should be considered a separate unit in the international system. Under the label of Europeanization theory, scholars have debated the interaction between EU-level foreign policy and national-level foreign policy. What also needs to be clarified is whether EU foreign policy complements, replaces, or competes with national foreign policy.
Scholars started to use the concept of Europeanization in the 1990s to examine the impact of European integration on the member states (authoritative volumes include Vink and Graziano 2006; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003) . Many focused on traditional EU regulatory policies, such as the transport, cohesion and environmental policies, which needed to be implemented nationally. One of the first scholars to apply the idea of Europeanization to the CFSP was Tonra (2001) in his study of the Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy. Although the effects of Europeanization are considered to be weaker in foreign policy than in regulatory policy, the concept has proved useful in analysing the relations between EU and national foreign policy. Interaction is typically considered a two-way street. Member states try to use EU foreign policy to pursue their own interests.
Yet, at the same time, they are also subject to European demands.
One reason for the member states to participate in EU foreign policy is to reach "politics of scale" (Ginsberg 1989) . Most member states have limited capacities and difficulty to achieve international impact. Rather than pursuing unilateral foreign policy, they may decide to act through the EU structures. The EU not only gives the member states often more leverage. It also protects them when dealing with the great powers.
Rather than addressing Russia themselves, for example, the Baltic states much prefer to go through Brussels. Also when it comes to discussing human rights with China, member states tend to voice their concerns through the EU rather than national channels of diplomacy. One way of looking at EU foreign policy is thus as a continuation of national foreign policy through different channels. 
The Governance of EU Foreign Policy
A final topic concerns the governance of EU foreign policy: how have the member states and the EU institutions organized policy-making? The CFSP is often said to be an intergovernmental policy where consensus rules and the member states are omnipotent.
Yet in reality the EU is multi-layered with a maze-like system of institutions. This also goes for the CFSP where authority is dispersed across different levels and actors. Actions in the CFSP are also often linked to other policy areas, such as trade and development, which are subject to different decision-making procedures. The question of governance is closely related to the discussion of the EU as an international actor. After all, the actorness of the EU largely depend on how the internal machinery and external representation are organized. It also speaks to Europeanization and the interaction between EU and national foreign policy. Governance structures affect how national policies are projected and how adaptation and socialization take place.
The relevance of studying the governance of EU foreign policy mirrors a development in the study of the EU more widely. The process of European integration had long been analysed from through the perspective of international relations and international organization. Since the mid-1990s, however, scholars have started to borrow concepts and theories from comparative politics and public administration (e.g. Hix 1994). The CFSP, albeit with a delay of about a decade, became an interesting laboratory for these kinds of theories as well. This development also brought about an interest in the EU's bureaucratic organization (Bauer and Trondal 2015) . Rather than only focusing on the foreign ministers, who take the formal decisions in EU foreign policy, scholars increasingly pay attention to the civil servants (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006).
The organization of EU foreign policy is also a recurring theme on the day-to-day agenda of the member states. From the EPC arrangements, which relied heavily on the rotating Presidency, to the negotiations over the organization of the EEAS, member states at times seem more concerned with their institutions than with producing actual output.
When analysing the governance of EU foreign policy, two issues can be studied. First, the coordination between the member states. As EU foreign policy has grown increasingly intensive and wider in scope, the member states have sought to improve the efficiency of their own coordination processes. Second, the delegation of functions to the EU institutions. To further increase coherence, efficiency, and impact, the member states have tasked the EU institutions with the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy.
The first set of governance questions involves the coordination process between the member states themselves. As EPC started modestly in 1970, the member states established a light coordination mechanism. Each six-monthly rotating Presidency would organize one ministerial meeting and two meetings of political directors in its own capital. The number of EPC meetings, however, increased quickly and the member states established a system of information-sharing to allow for continuous consultation. They also adopted rules of procedure, norms, started to coordinate in international organizations and third countries, and improved coordination between Presidencies.
Decisions were taken by consensus and the European Commission was kept at arm's length. Its role was limited to coordinating between EPC and the other policies of the European Communities to achieve coherence. The rotating Presidency was mandated to represent the member states internationally. As foreign policy cooperation became more prominent, the member states institutionalized their cooperation (Nuttall 1992; Smith 2004 ).
In a parallel development, the member states gradually moved foreign policy states. The member states have also gone out of their way to establish control over the EEAS. Indeed, the whole point of de novo bodies, such as the EEAS, is to keep foreign policy out of the powerful European Commission. In addition, it is also worth pointing out that while the EEAS resources are impressive, the total staff is similar only to that of a medium-sized national diplomatic service.
Weak leadership is also part of the reason why the EEAS has not exploited its full potential (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Although she had more powers and resources, former High Representative Catherine Ashton has been less entrepreneurial than her predecessor Solana. When she did get personally involved, it was often not controversial. Ashton did useful work rather than challenging the member states. It appears that the current High Representative Federica Mogherini, who assumed office in November 2014, exerts more leadership than Ashton. She has higher visibility and has been praised for concluding the negotiations with Iran concerning nuclear nonproliferation. She has furthermore been the driving force behind the EU Global Strategy.
Yet Mogherini has also been careful to complement the member states rather than to undermine them.
The governance of EU foreign policy has been extensively researched. While the parallel processes of institutionalization, Brusselization and delegation have given EU foreign policy some autonomy from its member states, it is not fully autonomous. Rather, EU foreign policy is uniquely organized as a machinery in which the member states and the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is no longer an ad hoc circus that travels across
Europe every six-months as a result of the changing Presidency. It is continuous and permanent; and transgovernmental rather than intergovernmental. The strength of EU foreign policy, nevertheless, still depends largely on the input of the member states.
Conclusion
The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, established the CFSP. This policy area has been further developed by the member states ever since. The CFSP has also received widespread attention from the scholarly community. It has sparked a range of new questions and puzzles for students of European integration. It has encouraged academics to experiment with different approaches ranging from international relations to comparative politics, foreign policy analysis, and public administration.
The EU's actorness and its identity have been topic of debate. It is far from evident that the EU, like sovereign states, has the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" (Sjöstedt 1977: 16 This article is far from exhaustive, but it raises a couple of reflections on the state-ofthe-art of CFSP research. First, it is impossible to analyse the CFSP through one overall concept or approach. The three themes identified in this article all have their own subquestions and research agendas. CFSP research is very rich and the pluralism in the research agenda should be seen mostly as a strength rather than as a weakness. The drawback is that for students of EU foreign policy, it is becoming nearly impossible to follow all the debates in their entirety. This has resulted in a certain degree of fragmentation.
Second, CFSP scholars make extensive use of concepts and perspectives originating outside their discipline. The research agendas on Europeanization and CFSP governance are two examples. The fact that scholars are open to insights from not only EU studies and international relations, but also comparative politics, public administration, economics, and sociology is a healthy sign. Having said that, it remains difficult to find the right balance between uniqueness of EU foreign policy, on the one hand, and using concepts and insights of other disciplines, on the other hand. When it works out, it is undeniably adds to our understanding of the CFSP. But some cases, transferring concepts across disciplines causes more problems than that it solves.
Third, we see a scholarly debate which has been very responsive to developments 
